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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, with whom SCIRICA, RENDELL, 
BARRY, FUENTES, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, 
JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, join. 
Does a party ―prevail‖ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 if it obtains a temporary restraining order the day after 
it files suit (after a hearing but before briefing from the 
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opposing side), but 22 days later is denied a preliminary 
injunction because the opposing party‘s voluntary change of 
position moots the case?  Because we believe that Supreme 
Court precedent requires us to answer no, we affirm the same 
determination by the District Court.
1 
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History 
 Live Gold Operations, Inc. manages and promotes the 
music recording and performing groups known as ―The 
Platters‖ and ―The Cornell Gunter Coasters‖ pursuant to 
licenses of unregistered trademarks.  In August 2007, the 
State of New Jersey learned that Live Gold had scheduled a 
two-week concert, to begin on August 18, of the Platters and 
Coasters groups at the Hilton Hotel in Atlantic City.  The 
State informed Live Gold that its use of the trademarks ―The 
Platters‖ and ―The Cornell Gunter Coasters‖ might violate the 
New Jersey Truth in Music Act, which provides in pertinent 
part: 
A person shall not advertise or 
conduct a live musical 
performance or production 
through the use of an affiliation, 
connection or association between 
the performing group and the 
recording group unless: 
(a)  The performing group is the 
authorized registrant and owner of 
a federal service mark for the 
group registered in the United 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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States Patent and Trademark 
Office; or 
(b)  At least one member of the 
performing group was a member 
of the recording group and has a 
legal right by virtue of use or 
operation under the group name 
without having abandoned the 
name or affiliation of the group; 
or 
(c)  The live musical performance 
or production is identified in all 
advertising and promotion as a 
salute or tribute; or 
(d)  The advertising does not 
relate to a live musical 
performance or production taking 
place in this State; or 
(e) The performance or 
production is expressly authorized 
by the recording group. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32B-2.  
 Live Gold responded by providing the State with 
evidence of its ownership of common law unregistered 
trademarks in each group‘s name and asserting that the 
unregistered trademarks should be considered ―express 
authorizations‖ under subsection (e).  Not satisfied that 
ownership of an unregistered trademark could comply with 
the Truth in Music Act, the State advised the Hilton Hotel 
that it could avoid liability under the Act by ticketing and 
5 
 
advertising the concert as a ―tribute‖ or ―salute‖ to the 
Platters and Coasters groups.  Hilton complied. 
 On August 17, 2007, the day before the first Hilton 
concert, Live Gold sued the State, seeking a TRO and 
injunctive relief against its enforcement of the Truth in Music 
Act in the manner it advised.  Live Gold argued, among other 
things, that the State‘s enforcement of the Act conflicted with 
the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and violated its 
civil rights.   
 At the TRO hearing before Judge Debevoise, Live 
Gold asserted that it had the right to conduct performances 
using its unregistered trademarks, and objected to the State‘s 
actions that caused the Hilton to label the groups‘ 
performances inaccurately as ―tributes‖ or ―salutes.‖  The 
State responded that, because Live Gold‘s unregistered 
trademarks were not ―express authorizations‖ under the Act, 
the Hilton concert must be billed as a tribute or salute.  Judge 
Debevoise expressed doubts about the State‘s position: 
That is not what [Live Gold‘s 
groups] want to do.  That is not 
what they say accurately describes 
them.  So, in effect, the State is 
telling the Hilton to advertise or 
publicize this event in a way 
which is not in accordance with 
the description which these 
promoters of the events say is 
accurate. 
. . . 
I think there is sufficient problem 
with the State‘s position so that I 
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– there is a likelihood of success 
on the merits in this particular 
case.   
. . . 
[T]here may be substantial federal 
rights being impaired by the 
action of the State in this case, 
generally, under the statute . . . 
important federal rights are at 
issue, both freedom of speech 
rights under the Lanham Act and 
private rights to nonregistered 
trademark – trade name.  
Consequently, the Temporary 
Restraining Order will issue. 
. . .  
[W]e‘ll have an opportunity to get 
to the merits of this case on 
September 7th. 
(Emphasis added.)  The TRO ―temporarily restrained and 
enjoined [the State] from interfering in any way with [the 
Hilton concert], and the marketing and promotion thereof.‖   
 On September 7, 2007, the parties returned to the 
District Court for a hearing on the preliminary injunction.  In 
its written submission prior to the hearing, the State argued 
that an unregistered trademark satisfied the Truth in Music 
Act only if the performing group obtained express 
authorization from an original group member, included an 
original member, or denominated itself as a tribute or salute 
to the original group.  The State contended that its 
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interpretation of the Act was consistent with the Lanham Act, 
the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  It also objected to Live Gold‘s suit 
on jurisdictional grounds. 
 Judge Debevoise began the preliminary injunction 
hearing by asking the State why it insisted on distinguishing 
between registered and unregistered trademarks:  ―Why 
shouldn‘t they proceed on an equal basis, two valid 
trademarks?‖  In response, the State contended that because 
the Lanham Act accorded a rebuttable presumption of validity 
to registered trademarks, its action here against unregistered 
trademarks was consistent with federal law.  Judge Debevoise 
repeatedly rejected this argument, explaining that the 
differences under federal law between registered and 
unregistered trademarks for purposes of validity did not 
authorize the State to discriminate against an unregistered 
trademark, once proven valid.  ―There‘s no reason for it,‖ he 
declared.  Nevertheless, the State continued to press its 
interpretation of the Truth in Music Act.  Judge Debevoise 
again rejected the State‘s position, stating, ―Well, I fail to see 
it.‖   
 After rejecting the State‘s arguments, Judge Debevoise 
suggested that the State reconcile the Truth in Music Act with 
the Lanham Act by interpreting subsection (e) of the former 
to permit unregistered trademark holders to perform under 
their group names without any additional requirements.  The 
State suddenly capitulated, effectively adopting Live Gold‘s 
interpretation of the Act.  Incredulous, Live Gold objected 
that the State had made ―a 180 degree shift in position.‖  
Judge Debevoise agreed, telling the State that the position in 
its brief was ―contrary to what I [just] understood you to say.‖  
In response, the State explained that its previous position 
―was inadvertently put into the brief.‖  The Judge then 
8 
 
declared that the State would be ―bound‖ by its new 
interpretation of the Act. 
 Live Gold then moved for summary disposition, 
contending that it ―should win‖ because the State had 
―admitt[ed] the allegations‖ in the complaint.  Judge 
Debevoise observed that the State‘s new position resolved the 
―basic legal problem, which was an equal protection problem, 
a First Amendment problem, [and] a due process problem.‖  
He again took note of the State‘s ―evolved‖ position, but saw 
no need to ―go any further.‖  He then announced: 
We have a statement by the State 
of New Jersey as to what the 
meaning of this statute is insofar 
as it relates to common law 
trademarks, and I think we‘ve 
stated it.  If there‘s a valid 
common law trademark under the 
Lanham Act, and if whoever has 
possession of it can establish a 
right to that possession, he is to be 
treated – or she is to be treated in 
the same way as the holder of a 
registered trademark.  Now, no 
necessity of – to say or give any 
tribute to anybody.  So we have 
an agreement on that. 
The Court then vacated the TRO, which had already expired 
―by its own term[s] [after] 10 days, and . . . was directed 
primarily to the August performance at the Hilton.‖  Having 
secured the State‘s position going forward, Judge Debevoise 
left open the option of continuing consideration of the 
preliminary injunction, but he found no need to convert the 
TRO to a preliminary injunction at that time. 
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 Subsequently, Pryor Cashman LLP sought leave to 
move for an award of its attorney‘s fees and costs incurred in 
representing Live Gold.  The issue was referred to Magistrate 
Judge Salas, who denied Pryor Cashman‘s application, 
concluding that Live Gold was not a ―prevailing party‖ under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) because the State had voluntarily 
changed its position on the meaning of the Truth in Music 
Act. 
 Live Gold sought review of Judge Salas‘s order by the 
District Court.  The State filed a motion to dismiss.  Judge 
Debevoise addressed both issues in a hearing on March 16, 
2009.   At that hearing, he first addressed the State‘s motion 
to dismiss.  Seeking to identify any unresolved constitutional 
issues, he asked the State to confirm that ―[e]ven though 
literally . . . [the Truth in Music Act] might be interpreted to 
exclude [performing groups holding unregistered 
trademarks], it doesn‘t really do so and you‘re not 
interpreting it to do so.‖  The State concurred, stating that 
―[t]he [revised] position we took on September 7, 2007, in 
this courtroom, is the position we‘re taking now.‖  Judge 
Debevoise then obtained the agreement of all parties that the 
preliminary injunction hearing resolved Live Gold‘s 
constitutional claims, and asked, ―Why shouldn‘t [Live 
Gold‘s complaint] be dismissed, other than [Pryor 
Cashman‘s] application for attorney‘s fees?‖  After hearing 
Live Gold‘s arguments, he remained unpersuaded, explaining 
―I just don‘t know what else there is to address. . . .  In effect, 
[Live Gold] won the case.‖ 
 Judge Debevoise then turned to Pryor Cashman‘s 
application for attorney‘s fees.  After hearing from Live Gold, 
he asked, ―State, why shouldn‘t you be responsible for 
attorney‘s fees[?]‖  In response, the State replied that a fee 
award was inappropriate because ―there was no past 
enforcement action‖ and because it had never taken any 
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position on the Truth in Music Act.  Judge Debevoise 
disagreed with the latter contention, reminding the State that 
it made a ―180 degree change in position because [it] came in 
negating everything that [Live Gold] [was] urging, and in 
effect conceded [Live Gold] [was] right, and permitted 
everything to go forward.‖  The State again distanced itself 
from its initial arguments, explaining that they were ―not . . . 
as clear as they could have been‖ because the State was 
rushed in responding to the TRO application.  The Court took 
the matter under advisement. 
 One month later, Judge Debevoise entered an order 
affirming the Magistrate Judge‘s order denying 
reimbursement of Live Gold‘s attorney‘s fees and granting 
the State‘s motion to dismiss.  In his order, Judge Debevoise 
held that Live Gold was not a prevailing party because he 
―did not enter a preliminary injunction or any other order on 
the merits of the case.‖  He also concluded that the State 
voluntarily changed its position, stating that ―[w]hile it may 
be true that this court‘s involvement aided in the resolution of 
the constitutional issues between the parties, the fact remains 
that the issues were not resolved as the result of a court 
order.‖  In granting the State‘s motion to dismiss, Judge 
Debevoise concluded that Live Gold‘s claims were moot in 
light of the parties‘ agreement that the preliminary injunction 
hearing had resolved all of Live Gold‘s constitutional claims.  
In this appeal, Live Gold challenges only the denial of 
attorney‘s fees. 
II.  Governing Precedent 
To be eligible to make a prevailing-party claim under 
§ 1988, the plaintiff must, ―at a minimum, . . . be able to point 
to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal 
relationship between itself and the defendant.‖  Tex. State 
Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 
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792 (1989).  The change must be ―judicially sanctioned,‖  
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001), and must ―achieve[] 
some of the benefit the part[y] sought in bringing suit,‖  
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  A ―voluntary change 
in conduct . . . lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the 
change.‖  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598-99.  In other words, ―a 
plaintiff does not become a ‗prevailing party‘ solely because 
his lawsuit causes a voluntary change in the defendant‘s 
conduct.‖  People Against Police Violence v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (―PPAV‖).  
Rather, the change in the parties‘ legal relationship must be 
the product of judicial action.  See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 
605-06. 
The Supreme Court so far has identified two 
resolutions that establish prevailing party eligibility: (1) 
judgments on the merits, and (2) court-ordered consent 
decrees (including settlement agreements enforced through 
consent decrees).  Id. at 604.  The first resolution contains 
two independent requirements:  (1) a judgment (2) that was 
on the merits.
2
  
A. The judgment requirement 
A grant of summary judgment or a trial verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff is no doubt a ―judgment.‖  In contrast, a 
court‘s ―judicial pronouncement that the defendant has 
violated the Constitution‖ does not create the requisite 
―material alteration of the legal relationship between the 
                                              
2
 Live Gold does not argue that the second resolution, ―court-
ordered consent decree,‖ is in play here, nor could it for the 
reasons discussed below.  See infra note 3. 
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parties . . . until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a 
judgment.‖  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1992). 
Thus, when an appellate court, in reversing the district 
court‘s dismissal of the plaintiff‘s claim, ruled that the 
plaintiff‘s constitutional rights were violated, the Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiff had not ―prevailed‖ because there 
was no enforceable judgment.  Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 
755, 760 (1987).  The only ―relief‖ to the plaintiff from this 
appellate victory was ―the moral satisfaction of knowing that 
a federal court concluded that his rights had been violated.‖  
Id. at 762.  
B. The merits requirement  
Any judgment must also be ―on the merits.‖  As 
recognized by the Supreme Court shortly after § 1988 was 
amended to allow attorney‘s fees, ―Congress intended to 
permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a party 
has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims.‖  
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (per 
curiam) (emphases added); see also id. at 757 (―[I]t seems 
clearly to have been the intent of Congress to permit such an 
interlocutory award only to a party who has established his 
entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims, either in 
the trial court or on appeal.‖).  Similarly, the Supreme Court 
has observed that ―[r]espect for ordinary language requires 
that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his 
claim before he can be said to prevail.‖  Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 
760.   
Indeed, in an area of the law that ―has been framed in 
various ways,‖ Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, the merits-based 
requirement established in Hanrahan and Hewitt has been 
consistently repeated throughout the Court‘s ―prevailing 
party‖ jurisprudence.  See Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 82 
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(2007); Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603–04, 608; Farrar, 506 
U.S. at 110–12; Garland, 489 U.S. at 790, 792.  We have 
followed suit to hold that, to be entitled to prevailing party 
fees based on interim relief, relief must be ―derived from 
some determination on the merits.‖  J.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. 
of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2002).  
III. Live Gold did not receive a “judgment on the 
merits,” and therefore was not a prevailing party. 
A. The temporary restraining order was not 
issued on the merits. 
In this case, we have a temporary restraining order.  In 
PAPV, we held that injunctive relief ―can, under appropriate 
circumstances, render a party ‗prevailing.‘‖  520 F.3d at 233. 
However, the ―merits‖ requirement is difficult to meet 
in the context of TROs and preliminary injunctions, as the 
plaintiff in those instances needs only to show a likelihood  of 
success on the merits (that is, a reasonable chance, or 
probability, of winning) to be granted relief.  A ―likelihood‖ 
does not mean more likely than not.  Cf. Hackett v. Price, 381 
F.3d 281, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2004).  Because of this, we have 
held that a court‘s finding of ―reasonable probability of 
success on the merits‖ is not a resolution of ―any merit-based 
issue.‖  John T. v. Del. County, 318 F.3d 545, 559 (3d Cir. 
2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  As this 
―probability‖ ruling is usually the only merits-related legal 
determination made when courts grant TROs and preliminary 
injunctions, it follows that parties will not often ―prevail‖ 
based solely on those events.  
Our decision in PAPV provides an example of that rare 
situation where a merits-based determination is made at the 
injunction stage.  There, a rally organizer challenged the 
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constitutionality of an ordinance that required groups to 
prepay police protection costs before they could receive a 
permit for parades and rallies.  PAPV, 520 F.3d at 229.  At the 
first hearing in the case, the District Court granted the 
requested TRO after ―concluding that [the ordinance] ‗was 
facially unconstitutional,‘‖ and that, even if the City 
voluntarily did not enforce the ordinance (as it had offered to 
do), ―a permit regime devoid of any prescribed process would 
also be unconstitutional.‖  Id.  Therefore, the Court enjoined 
the City from enforcing the law, imposed its own temporary 
procedures governing permits, and directed the parties to 
meet and confer concerning a new proposal.  Id. at 229–30.  
The City later proposed a revised ordinance, but the Court 
found it lacking, converted the TRO to a preliminary 
injunction, and requested further briefing.  Id. at 230.  
The City submitted a second revised ordinance, and in 
the meantime formally repealed the unconstitutional 
provision.  Id.  After this repeal, the City moved to dismiss 
the suit.  Id.  The Court denied the motion because no new 
procedures had taken the now-repealed ordinance‘s place, and 
a lack of guidelines was itself unconstitutional.  Id.  The 
injunction remained in effect for over two years until a new 
ordinance was enacted that satisfied the concerns of the 
Court.  Id.  Only then did it lift the injunction and close the 
case with the parties‘ agreement.  Id. 
The legal victories in PAPV are far from the events 
now before us.  Judge Debevoise here never ruled, as did the 
PAPV Court, that the challenged law (or application of the 
law) was unconstitutional.  Id. at 234.  Instead, the TRO was 
based only on a ―likelihood of success on the merits.‖3  App. 
                                              
3
 While Judge Debevoise suggested at the TRO hearing that 
the State‘s interpretation of the law posed ―a very serious 
problem‖ and recognized ―a significant risk there may be 
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187.  In PAPV, the TRO prohibited enforcement of the 
challenged ordinance and affirmatively created new 
procedures to govern the City.  The TRO in our case merely 
enjoined the State of New Jersey ―from interfering in any way 
with live performances by [Live Gold‘s] . . . groups at the 
Hilton Hotel in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and the marketing 
and promotion thereof.‖  The State remained free to enforce 
the Truth in Music Act (so long as it did not interfere with the 
Hilton performances).
4
 
                                                                                                     
substantial federal rights being impaired by the action of the 
State,‖ that will be true in almost all of these cases—§ 1988 
deals with civil rights cases, which typically involve ―very 
serious‖ and ―substantial federal rights.‖  Judge Debevoise 
acknowledged that ―the State maybe has some merit to its 
position‖ (emphasis added), and stated it could resolve the 
merits ―at a later date upon the return day of the Order to 
Show Cause.‖   
 
4
 Contrary to the concerns expressed by Judge Roth, we do 
not mean to ―cast[] doubt‖ on the ―well-supported legal 
proposition‖ that, in some cases, interim injunctive relief may 
be sufficient to warrant attorney‘s fees.  We agree that 
―interim relief remains a proper basis for an award of 
attorney‘s fees when that relief is based on a determination of 
the merits of the plaintiff‘s claims.‖  We emphasize, however, 
that the determination must be merits-based, like the PAPV 
Court‘s decision that the challenged law in that case was 
unconstitutional, and may not be merely a finding of a 
likelihood of success on the merits, as in this case.   
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Therefore, the TRO here was not merits-based.
5
  As 
such, it does not confer eligibility for prevailing party status.  
We thus turn to whether anything occurred after the TRO to 
resolve the controversy on the merits and render Live Gold 
the prevailing party under § 1988. 
B. The State’s actions after the TRO issued 
were voluntary, and no judgment was issued 
on the merits. 
 There was no determination on the merits in this case 
because the State mooted the case at the preliminary 
injunction hearing by agreeing with Live Gold‘s position.  As 
noted, the Supreme Court has identified two formal 
resolutions that make a winning attorney eligible for a fee 
award:  (1) enforceable judgments on the merits, and (2) 
court-ordered consent decrees.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.  
Buckhannon characterized these two resolutions as 
―examples‖ of decisions that create the necessary material 
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.  Id. at 604–
05.  There may be resolutions other than the two identified in 
Buckhannon that warrant prevailing party status (although the 
Supreme Court has yet to identify any).  But even if they are 
                                              
5
 Judge Roth argues that the TRO was a ―functional 
determination on the merits‖ because it ―protected Live Gold 
from a potential enforcement action by the State‖ and allowed 
the concert series to proceed without being labeled a 
―tribute.‖  Thus, she contends, ―Live Gold had largely 
obtained the relief it requested.‖  While this has surface 
appeal, the Supreme Court has told us it is not enough.  As we 
have explained, Live Gold did not obtain a judgment on the 
merits of its claim.  Without that, it is simply not entitled to 
attorney‘s fees.     
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merely examples, Buckhannon precludes the events in this 
case from qualifying as a third form of resolution that can 
support prevailing party status. 
 Some background helps to understand the sea change 
caused by Buckhannon in this area of the law.  Prior to that 
decision, the rule in most circuits was that a plaintiff was a 
―prevailing party‖ if it ―achieve[d] the desired result because 
the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the 
defendant‘s conduct.‖  Id. at 601–02.  This became known as 
the ―catalyst theory.‖  Id. 
 For example, we held pre-Buckhannon that a plaintiff 
who could ―prove that the existence of the lawsuit 
accomplished the original objectives of the lawsuit without a 
formal judgment c[ould] be a ‗prevailing party.‘‖  
Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 544 
(3d Cir. 1994), overruled by Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602–
05.  We applied the ―well-established‖ catalyst theory to 
allow attorney‘s fees when defendants ―voluntarily changed 
their behavior to eliminate the complained-of conduct.‖  Id.  
To support this theory, we relied in part on the policy 
consideration that ―if defendants could deprive plaintiffs of 
attorney‘s fees by unilaterally mooting the underlying case by 
conceding to plaintiffs‘ demands, attorneys might be more 
hesitant about bringing these civil rights suits, a result 
inconsistent with Congress‘ intent in enacting section 1988.‖  
Id. at 548.  Thus, we held that plaintiffs could be prevailing 
parties ―notwithstanding the absence of a judgment or consent 
decree‖ so long as they ―accomplished the original objectives 
of the lawsuit.‖  Id. at 544, 551. 
 Were this the law governing us today, we would hold 
the prevailing party requirement satisfied, as Live Gold 
accomplished its objectives by filing a lawsuit that 
―catalyzed‖ the State to change its position voluntarily.  In 
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Baumgartner it did not matter that there was no judgment or 
consent decree; because the ―existence of the lawsuit 
accomplished the original objectives of the lawsuit,‖ 
attorney‘s fees would be warranted.  Id. at 544.  
 But Buckhannon overruled Baumgartner, and the latter 
is no longer the law.  In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that theretofore it had ―only awarded attorney‘s 
fees‖ when the plaintiff obtained a ―judgment on the merits‖ 
or a ―court-ordered consent decree.‖  532 U.S. at 605.  It had 
not awarded attorney‘s fees under the following 
circumstances:  where the plaintiff acquired a ―judicial 
pronouncement that the defendant has violated the 
Constitution unaccompanied by ‗judicial relief,‘‖ id. at 606 
(quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760) (emphasis in original); 
where the plaintiff ―secured the reversal of a directed 
verdict,‖ id. at 605–06 (citing Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 759); or 
where there was a ―nonjudicial alteration of actual 
circumstances,‖ id. at 606 (citation omitted) (internal 
quotations marks omitted).  The ―catalyst theory‖ was added 
to this list, as there is no ―judicially sanctioned change‖ in the 
parties‘ ―legal relationship.‖  Id. at 605.  ―A defendant‘s 
voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing 
what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the 
necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.‖  Id.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court concluded, ―the ‗catalyst theory‘ is not a 
permissible basis for the award of attorney‘s fees . . . .‖  Id. at 
610.   
 In so holding, it considered the same policy argument 
we raised in Baumgartner—that without the catalyst theory 
―defendants [could] unilaterally moot[] an action before 
judgment in an effort to avoid an award of attorney‘s fees‖—
but was not swayed.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608–09.  Thus, 
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however persuasive that argument may seem, it cannot 
influence our decision here.
6
 
*    *    *    *    * 
 The TRO Live Gold obtained was plainly not a 
―judgment on the merits.‖  Judge Debevoise, who entered the 
TRO, certainly did not think so.  At the preliminary 
injunction hearing the State chose to agree with the position 
pressed by the plaintiff.  As that agreement resolved the 
constitutional issues, the case was mooted.  Even if there are 
circumstances where a ―judgment on the merits‖ or a ―court-
ordered consent decree‖ is not required for prevailing-party 
status, Buckhannon prevents the events in this case from 
qualifying.  
 Because no enforceable judgment on the merits issued 
in this case and the State‘s actions that mooted the case were 
voluntary, Buckhannon tells us that Live Gold was not a 
prevailing party.  Given that precedent, we affirm.   
 
 
                                              
6
 We doubt that the consequences of our decision today will 
be nearly as severe as Judge Aldisert foreshadows.  In any 
event, our job is to follow Supreme Court precedent.  Judge 
Aldisert writes about what the law should be, but we must 
deal with what the law is.   
 Singer Management Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram 
No. 09-2238 
          
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom McKEE, Chief 
Judge, SLOVITER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, join. 
 
 “When does a party „prevail‟ within the meaning of 42 
U.S.C. § 1988?”  That is the basic question that both parties 
here are asking.  The Majority qualifies the question by 
referring to certain facts of record:  “Does a party „prevail‟ if 
it obtains a temporary restraining order the day after it files 
suit . . . but 22 days later is denied a preliminary injunction 
because the opposing party‟s voluntary change of position 
moots the case?”  The Majority answers “No” to the question.  
 
 I would add different facts to the basic question – and, 
by doing so, I arrive at a different answer.  My “different” 
qualifying facts are clearly found in the record of this case.  
Moreover, my facts support a finding of “prevailing party.”   
 
 I acknowledge that the qualifying facts that the 
Majority depends upon are reflected in the record before us.  
As the Majority states, there was a temporary restraining 
order (TRO) granted.  The Majority does not mention, 
however, that the TRO granted a large part of the relief 
plaintiffs sought.   
 
 Again, as the Majority states, there was no preliminary 
injunction (PI) granted when the parties returned for the 
September 7
 
hearing.  But, insofar as Live Gold was asking to 
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enjoin the State‟s interference with the August concert, the 
issue was moot.  The concert had been performed as Live 
Gold requested, that relief had been granted, and there was no 
further need to consider it.  The issue remaining was whether 
the State would attempt to force other concerts by the holder 
of a valid common law trademark to be designated as 
“tributes” or “salutes.”  The State agreed that it would not 
apply the Act in such a way.  Moreover, the PI, which would 
have addressed this issue, was not dismissed out of hand.  The 
court left open the option of continuing consideration of the 
PI at a later time if necessary, explaining “[s]o I‟m not setting 
a date, I‟m vacating the temporary restraining order, and if 
there‟s any serious problems that arise which the plaintiffs 
think require emergent relief, they can ask for it to be 
rescheduled on short notice.”  (App. 389.)  That the court felt 
that such relief would not be necessary is evident from the 
fact that the court had declared that the State would be 
“bound by” the State‟s new interpretation of the Act.  (App. 
387.)  The court saw no need to “go any further.”   (App. 
388.) 
  
 The court took note of the State‟s “evolved” position 
and then stated: 
 
We have a statement by the State of New Jersey 
as to what the meaning of this statute is insofar 
as it relates to common law trademarks, and I 
think we‟ve stated it.  If there‟s a valid common 
law trademark under the Lanham Act, and if 
whoever has possession of it can establish a 
right to that possession, he is to be treated – or 
she is to be treated in the same way as the 
holder of a registered trademark.  Now, no 
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necessity of – to say or give any tribute to 
anybody.  So we have an agreement on that.  
 
(App. 388.)  There was no dissent. 
 
 This conclusion by the court, that a valid common law 
trademark was to be recognized in the same way as a 
registered trademark, was the merits question put to the court 
by Live Gold – and the State of New Jersey was now bound 
in this action by this legal conclusion.  I cannot imagine that 
the State would dare come again before the District Court and 
take any position contrary to the ruling of the court:  “So we 
have an agreement on that.”  Nor, as I discuss later, would the 
State be in the position to contend in any future action before 
the New Jersey District Court that a valid common law 
trademark was not to be accorded the same recognition as a 
registered one.  If it did so, the State would be barred by 
judicial estoppel.      
 
 With these facts in mind, I state my question as 
follows:  “Does a party „prevail‟ under the meaning of 42 
U.S.C. § 1988 when it has obtained a TRO, granting an 
important part of the relief sought, and further when its 
opponent has been bound by the District Court to the position 
of law that grants complete relief on the merits of the 
complaint.”  I answer “Yes.”  I conclude from this factual 
setting, supported by the record, that Live Gold is clearly a 
prevailing party and, thus, deserves an award of its reasonable 
attorney‟s fees.    
 
Moreover, this conclusion is within the boundaries of 
“prevailing party” as the Supreme Court has set them out.  
First, I agree with the Majority that the Court points to two 
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types of outcomes – judgments on the merits and consent 
decrees – that confer prevailing party status, and it cites one 
outcome – a voluntary change in conduct as a result of 
litigation – that does not.  Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 
603-05 (2001).  Nevertheless, as the Majority concedes, the 
Court has left the door open to other, yet to be defined, results 
that may confer prevailing party status.  See ante, 16-17.   
 
The Court has articulated two factors relevant to the 
prevailing party inquiry:  (1) whether there is a “judicially 
sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,” id. 
at 603, that “achieves some of the benefit the part[y] sought 
in bringing suit,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 
(1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and 
(2) whether the party “receive[s] at least some relief on the 
merits of his claims,” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (“„It 
seems clearly to have been the intent of Congress to permit . . 
. an interlocutory award only to a party who has established 
his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims, 
either in the trial court or on appeal.‟” (quoting Hanrahan v. 
Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980))).   
 
The Majority contends, however, that Live Gold did 
not receive a judgment on the merits.  The Majority does 
agree that the TRO Live Gold obtained constituted a 
judgment and that injunctive relief “can, under appropriate 
circumstances, render a party „prevailing.‟” See ante, 13 
(quoting People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh 
(PAPV), 520 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)).  But, I part ways 
with the Majority on its conclusion that the TRO here was not 
a resolution on the merits.  
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 I find it clear that the TRO obtained by Live Gold was 
a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship” 
between Live Gold and the State of New Jersey.  The TRO 
allowed Live Gold to achieve much of the benefit it sought in 
bringing suit and provided some relief on the merits of its 
claims.  Before the TRO hearing, New Jersey indicated that 
Live Gold could be penalized if the Platters and the Coasters 
were not billed as “tribute” bands.  After the District Court 
issued the TRO, the bands were permitted to perform under 
the names “Platters” and “Coasters” without modifiers like 
“tribute” or “salute to,” and the State was prohibited from 
penalizing Live Gold for doing so.   
 
Perhaps, the Majority balks at the straightforward 
conclusion that there was relief here on the merits because it 
fears that “consent decrees” and “judgments on the merits,” 
or their equivalents, are the only types of outcomes that 
confer prevailing party status.  However, as the Majority 
seems to concede, there is little doubt that a plaintiff who 
gains preliminary relief may be a prevailing party.  The 
Supreme Court has not disturbed the longstanding rule that 
“„plaintiffs may be considered „prevailing parties‟ for 
attorneys‟ fees purposes if they succeed on any significant 
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the 
parties sought in bringing suit,‟” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 
103, 109 (1992) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433), as long 
as the relief obtained provides at least some relief on the 
merits, see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604, and consists of a 
judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the 
parties, see Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per 
curiam) (plaintiff not prevailing party where declaratory 
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judgment was entered after his death and thus could not 
change his legal relationship to defendants).
1
  
 
Moreover, the precedent of this Circuit – and that of 
every other circuit but one – is clear that interim injunctive 
relief can, in appropriate cases, constitute a “court-ordered 
change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant” to confer prevailing party status.  See PAPV, 520 
F.3d at 232-33 (concluding that “relief on the merits achieved 
in the form of a preliminary injunction can confer „prevailing 
party‟ status”) (internal quotations omitted).2  The Majority‟s  
                                              
1
Farrar makes clear that the benefit need not be 
significant.  There, the Court held that a plaintiff awarded 
nominal damages is a prevailing party, because the award 
“modifies the defendant‟s behavior for the plaintiff‟s benefit 
by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he 
otherwise would not pay.”  506 U.S. at 113. 
2
Accord McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 596-602 
(6th Cir. 2010) (opining on whether granting a preliminary 
injunction may render a party prevailing always, sometimes, 
or never, and favoring an award when the interim relief 
indicates probable success on the merits and effects “a lasting 
change in the legal relationship between the parties”); 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, 611 F.3d 1209, 1217 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (“[T]o be a prevailing party on the basis of a 
preliminary injunction requires „relief on the merits‟ . . . .”); 
Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(“the entry of an enforceable judgment, such as a stay or 
preliminary injunction, may permit the district court to confer 
prevailing-party status on the plaintiff notwithstanding the 
absence of a final judgment on the underlying claim”); 
Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1355-56 (11th 
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Cir. 2009) (awarding prevailing party status to plaintiffs that 
had obtained a preliminary injunction, but were later denied a 
permanent injunction as a result of intervening legislation); 
Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524-26 (5th Cir. 
2008) (noting the absence of Supreme Court authority on 
point and variety in the circuits‟ handling of the issue and 
applying its own three-part test to find that granting a 
preliminary injunction conferred prevailing party status); 
Advantage Media, LLC v. City of Hopkins, 511 F.3d 833, 837 
(8th Cir. 2008) (recognizing “a preliminary injunction can in 
some instances carry the judicial imprimatur required by 
Buckhannon to convey prevailing party status,” but finding 
that final judgment in the case before it reversed the effect of 
the preliminary injunction); Dupuy v. Samuels, 423 F.3d 714, 
723, 723 n.4 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming that a preliminary 
injunction may justify an award of attorney‟s fees based on 
prevailing party status); Watson v. Cnty. of Riverside, 300 
F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A preliminary injunction 
issued by a judge carries all the „judicial imprimatur‟ 
necessary to satisfy Buckhannon.”); Race v. Toledo-Davilla, 
291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 2002) (“an individual may be 
entitled to attorney‟s fees without having obtained a favorable 
final judgment following a full trial on the merits, but he must 
obtain relief based on the merits of at least some of his 
claims.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted)); but see 
Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 274-78 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(expressing doubts as to whether a preliminary injunction 
may confer prevailing party status); cf. PAPV, 520 F.3d at 
232-33, 233 n.4 (noting that the Fourth Circuit is the “only 
one arguably dissenting Court of Appeals” (citing Smyth, 282 
F.3d at 276-77)). 
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analysis casts doubt upon this well-supported legal 
proposition. I hope, however, that this Court will continue to 
recognize that interim relief remains a proper basis for an 
award of attorney‟s fees when that relief is based on a 
determination of the merits of a plaintiff‟s claim. 
 
Furthermore, the Majority‟s conclusion that the TRO 
in this case was not granted “on the merits” suffers from the 
failure of the Majority to offer a definition or test for when a 
decision is “on the merits” in a case involving the grant of 
preliminary relief.  Rather, the Majority states merely that 
“the „merits‟ requirement is difficult to meet in the context of 
TROs and preliminary injunctions,” and that the “decision in 
PAPV provides an example of that rare situation where a 
merits-based determination is made at the injunction stage.”  
Ante, 13.  This conclusion is confusing in light of the 
Majority‟s acknowledgment that to obtain a TRO or 
preliminary injunction, the plaintiff needs to “show a 
likelihood of success on the merits.”  Id.; see also Munaf v. 
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008).  One would expect that 
when a plaintiff makes a sufficient showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits to obtain “an „extraordinary and drastic 
remedy,‟” a remedy that is “never awarded as of right,” 
Munaf, 533 U.S. at 689-90, this victory would frequently 
result in prevailing party status.
 3
 
                                              
3
The Majority attempts to evade this common-sense 
conclusion by mistakenly arguing that “„likelihood‟ does not 
mean more likely that than not.”  Ante at 13 (citing Hackett v. 
Price, 381 F.3d 281, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2004).)  But Hackett 
was not a preliminary injunction case – it was a habeas case 
concerning the constitutionality of jury instructions at the 
penalty phase of a capital case, where the question was 
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Instead, the Majority argues that a preliminary 
injunction reflects a determination on the merits only in a 
case like PAPV, where the court granted a preliminary 
injunction lasting two years, and stated that the challenged 
statute was “facially unconstitutional.”  While it was clear in 
PAPV that the District Court‟s determination was “on the 
merits,” I disagree with the Majority‟s suggestion that such 
elaboration of facts is required.  This Court‟s post-
Buckhannon precedents have never applied such a standard.  
Rather, in J.O. v. Orange Twp., we stated simply that 
plaintiffs “who achieve favorable interim relief may be 
entitled to prevailing party attorney‟s fees as long as the 
interim relief granted derived from some determination on the 
merits.”  287 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).  
Contrary to the Majority‟s reasoning, PAPV did not 
distinguish “reasonable probability” from “more likely than 
not,” nor did it consider whether the district court had found 
that the plaintiffs were more likely than not to prevail on their 
                                                                                                     
“whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has 
applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the 
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.”  Id. at 
290.  Hackett acknowledged that “[a]s one definition of 
„likely‟ is „having a better chance of existing or occurring 
than not,‟ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
1310 (1971), someone could plausibly argue that „reasonable 
likelihood‟ is not a lesser standard than „more likely than 
not.‟”  Indeed, “courts use a bewildering variety of 
formulations of the need for showing some likelihood of 
success.” 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.3 (2d. 
ed. 2010).   
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claims.  It simply noted that, as was the case here, the grant of 
preliminary injunctive relief reflected a “finding of a 
likelihood of plaintiff‟s success on the merits.”  Id. at 233. 
 
I submit that the proper test to determine whether 
interim relief is on the merits is to distinguish (1) whether the 
relief is a “„stay put‟ order[] which merely serve[s] to 
maintain the status quo pendente lite” and which “do[es] not 
afford meaningful relief on the merits of the underlying 
claims,” PAPV, 520 F.3d at 226 (citing John T. ex rel. Paul T. 
v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558-59 (3d Cir. 
2003)), or (2) whether the relief “placed a judicial imprimatur 
on plaintiffs‟ entitlement to substantially all the relief they 
sought in the complaint.”  520 F.3d at 233.4   
                                              
4
We address temporary restraining orders and 
preliminary injunctions together, as the two share nearly 
identical factors which courts evaluate in granting such 
interim relief and, in certain circumstances, have identical 
legal effect.  See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  The most significant differences are that 
temporary restraining orders may be issued with little or no 
notice and may dissolve on their own accord.  Id. (discussing 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2)).  Nevertheless, temporary restraining 
orders, like preliminary injunctions, may touch on the merits 
of a case to sufficiently alter the legal relationship between 
parties to confer prevailing party status.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(a) (“„Judgment‟ as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies.”); Robinson v. 
Lehman, 771 F.2d 772, 782 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The denial of a 
temporary restraining order is not generally appealable unless 
its denial decides the merits of the case or is equivalent to a 
dismissal of the claim.”).  
11 
 
 
Several circuits, in considering this issue, have adopted 
similar rules.  See, e.g., Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561 
F.3d 97, 106 (2d Cir. 2009) (“a plaintiff‟s request for a 
temporary restraining order may be sufficient grounds to 
grant attorney‟s fees to the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1988(b)[,]” as long as the temporary restraining order 
addresses the merits of the case and does not “merely 
maintain[] the status quo”); Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 
F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Under these facts, to qualify 
as a prevailing party under § 1988(b), we hold that the 
plaintiff (1) must win a preliminary injunction, (2) based 
upon an unambiguous indication of probable success on the 
merits of the plaintiff‟s claims as opposed to a mere balancing 
of the equities in favor of the plaintiff, (3) that causes the 
defendant to moot the action, which prevents the plaintiff 
from obtaining final relief on the merits.”); N. Cheyenne 
Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting 
that “some preliminary injunctions are sufficiently akin to 
final relief on the merits to confer prevailing party status,” 
whereas others that “merely maintain[] the status quo do[] not 
confer prevailing party status”); Dubuc v. Green Oak Twp., 
312 F.3d 736, 753 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that granting a 
preliminary injunction may confer prevailing party status if 
the injunction represents “an unambiguous indication of 
probable success on the merits, and not merely a maintenance 
of the status quo ordered because the balance of equities 
greatly favors the plaintiff” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 
This well-established rule has several advantages.  
First, it properly focuses the inquiry on whether the plaintiff 
obtained relief based on the merits of its claims rather than 
other interim relief factors.  Compare PAPV, 520 F.3d at 232-
12 
 
33 (noting district court‟s repeated findings of 
unconstitutionality) with John T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate 
Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that TRO was 
merely to preserve status quo so that court could consider the 
merits of plaintiff‟s claims).   
 
Second, this rule avoids the concerns voiced in 
Buckhannon and by the Majority that the catalyst theory is 
being revived:  the test focuses on the nature of the district 
court‟s findings, not the defendant‟s response to those 
findings or its motivations.   
 
Third, this rule promotes judicial efficiency in a 
significant class of civil rights cases where the plaintiff 
essentially challenges government policies prohibiting a 
discreet course of action in the future, such as advertising for 
a concert or demonstrating in front of city hall.  The practical 
reality in such cases is that a TRO or preliminary injunction 
that enables the plaintiff to do what it wants to do, i.e., 
advertise for a concert or demonstrate, is often all the relief 
the plaintiff wants or needs.  It may be counterproductive and 
wasteful of judicial resources to require a plaintiff to insist on 
a final order that it no longer needs before it can be 
considered a prevailing party and obtain attorney‟s fees.  
 
When the proper test is applied, it becomes clear that 
the TRO granted to Live Gold provided “at least some relief 
on the merits of . . . [the] claims,” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 
604.  In PAPV, this Court emphasized that: 
 
(1) the trial court, based upon a finding of a 
likelihood of plaintiffs‟ success on the merits, 
entered a judicially enforceable order granting 
13 
 
plaintiffs virtually all the relief they sought, 
thereby materially altering the legal relationship 
between the parties; (2) the defendant, after 
opposing interim relief, chose not to appeal 
from that order and remained subject to its 
restrictions for a period of over two years; and 
(3) the defendant ultimately avoided final 
resolution of the merits of plaintiffs‟case by 
enacting new legislation giving plaintiffs 
virtually all of the relief sought in the 
complaint. 
520 F.3d at 233.   
 
 The result here is substantially similar:  the District 
Court found that Live Gold was likely to succeed on the 
merits of its claims, it entered a TRO affording Live Gold the 
most significant relief it sought, the right to advertise and to 
present the August concert outright, and not as a “tribute.” As 
a result, the State was “temporarily restrained and enjoined 
from interfering in any way with live performances by 
Plaintiffs‟ respective groups at the Hilton Hotel in Atlantic 
City, New Jersey, and the marketing and promotion thereof.” 
(App. 190.)  The District Court clearly indicated that it 
considered the merits of the substantive legal issues during 
the TRO hearing and granted the TRO in light of its view on 
those issues:   
 
I think there is sufficient problem with the 
State‟s position so that I – there is a likelihood 
of success on the merits in this particular case.   
. . . 
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[T]here may be substantial federal rights being 
impaired by the action of the State in this case, 
generally, under the statute . . . important 
federal rights are at issue, both freedom of 
speech rights under the Lanham Act and private 
rights to nonregistered trademark – trade name.  
Consequently, the Temporary Restraining Order 
will issue. 
   
(App. 187-88.)   
 
 The District Court‟s statement that it will “have an 
opportunity to get to the merits of this case on September 7th 
[at the preliminary injunction hearing]” does not nullify its 
determination on the merits that the August concert proceed 
as Live Gold requested; it indicates only that the court 
planned to consider whether Live Gold deserved further relief 
for future concerts.   
 
In addition, the TRO obtained in this case cannot be 
characterized as a “stay put” order or relief pendent lite.  
Rather, in the present case, the District Court‟s issuance of a 
TRO effectively gave Live Gold a complete victory on one 
important issue in the litigation.  The musical groups being 
promoted by Live Gold – “The Platters” and “The Cornell 
Gunter Coasters” – were scheduled for a two-week 
engagement at the Hilton Hotel to begin on August 18.  On 
August 17, the day before the first Hilton concert, Live Gold 
sought and obtained the TRO preventing the State from 
enforcing the Truth in Music Act in relation to the 
performances at issue.  By the time Live Gold and the State 
returned to court on September 7, for a hearing on the 
preliminary injunction, the concert series had already 
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concluded – and not as a “tribute.”  Thus, at that point, the 
TRO had protected Live Gold from a potential enforcement 
action by the State, and Live Gold had largely obtained the 
relief it requested.   
 
In this light, the TRO Live Gold obtained was a 
functional determination on the merits.  It exalts form over 
substance to claim, as the Majority does, that Live Gold has 
not succeeded on the merits when what Live Gold wanted to 
do was to promote and present without interference from the 
State musical groups for which it held a valid common law 
trademark.  The District Court issued a TRO – clearly 
premised on the merits of the claims at issue – compelling the 
State to permit Live Gold to do just that.  In this case, Live 
Gold fits comfortably within “our respect for [the] ordinary 
language” definition of “prevailing party.”  Buckhannon, 532 
U.S. at 603.   
 
In addition to the judicial order here, the District Court 
permanently altered the legal relationship between the parties.  
The court‟s statement that the State would be “bound” by its 
new interpretation of the Act should bar the State from taking 
any inconsistent positions in future litigation because of the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel.  Judicial estoppel is an equitable 
doctrine that entails “„the intrinsic ability of courts to dismiss 
an offending litigant‟s complaint without considering the 
merits of the underlying claims when such dismissal is 
necessary to prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose 
with the courts.‟”  In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc. 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2003)).  
“[T]he basic principle of judicial estoppel . . . is that absent 
any good explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain 
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an advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an 
inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible theory.”  
Krystal Cadillac, 337 F.3d at 319 (quoting Ryan Operations 
G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d 
Cir. 1996)). “Though there is no rigid test for judicial 
estoppel, three factors inform a federal court‟s decision 
whether to apply it:  there must be (1) „irreconcilably 
inconsistent positions;‟ (2) „adopted . . . in bad faith;‟ and (3) 
„a showing that . . . estoppel . . . address[es] the harm and . . . 
no lesser sanction [is] sufficient.‟” G-I Holdings, Inc. v. 
Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Chao v. Roy’s Constr., Inc., 517 F.3d 180, 186 n.5 (3d Cir. 
2008)).   
 
Here, once the State had reversed course and accepted 
that a valid common law trademark must be treated in the 
same way as a registered trademark, the State would be 
judicially estopped from adopting a contrary interpretation of 
the Act in any subsequent judicial proceeding and certainly in 
any proceeding against Live Gold.  This is the significance of 
the District Court‟s statement that the State was “bound” to 
its new interpretation.  Moreover, it showed that the District 
Court must have relied on this commitment by the State when 
the court did not enter a permanent injunction against the 
State.  If the State were to assert again that the Truth in Music 
Act does not recognize valid common law trademarks, it 
would be asserting an inconsistent position in presumptive 
bad faith after already having conceded the wrongfulness of 
such an assertion.  Judicial estoppel, therefore, would apply to 
prevent the State from perpetuating a fraud on the court.  See 
New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751 (noting that a court 
addressing judicial estoppel should consider “whether the 
party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive 
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an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the 
opposing party if not estopped”).   
 
In conclusion, we see that the District Court‟s binding 
of the State resulted in “a court-ordered „chang[e] [in] the 
legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant‟” 
necessary to permit an award of attorney‟s fees.  Buckhannon, 
532 U.S. at 604.  In this sense, the State‟s voluntary 
concession and the District Court‟s “binding” of the State to 
that position would prevent the State from taking contrary 
positions in future litigation; it can be analogized to the 
voluntary action of a consent decree:  in both instances, 
voluntary conduct formalized by a court results in a material 
alteration in the legal relationship between the parties.   
 
Moreover, requiring a party to go further than Live 
Gold did in this case by obtaining a judgment or consent 
decree would endanger the practical, efficient, and informal 
resolution achieved by the District Court in this case.  I 
suspect that Live Gold would never have accepted the District 
Court‟s resolution of the case in the way it did if it had it 
known that it would not be a prevailing party.  Live Gold 
would have insisted on greater judicial formalization of the 
change in the State‟s position, a consent decree, or the like.  
The Majority‟s insistence on a “judgment,” rather than 
Buckhannon‟s broader “judicial imprimatur,” will only 
unnecessarily drag out cases and lead to judicial inefficiency.  
The essential question in the prevailing party inquiry is 
whether the party has obtained a judicial alteration of the 
legal relationship between the parties.  Live Gold certainly 
accomplished that.   
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Under these circumstances, an award of attorney‟s fees 
is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, see Buckhannon, 
532 U.S. at 603, and required by this Court‟s precedent, see 
PAPV, 520 F.3d at 232-33. 
 
 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.  
I would confer prevailing party status to Live Gold and award 
it its attorney‟s fees. 
1 
Singer Management Consultants, Inc.; Live Gold Operations, 
Inc. v. Annie Milgram, No 09-2238 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
As I join in all respects the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Roth, I deem it necessary to add these observations regarding 
civil rights cases proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 
1988. How a judge applies the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 
(2001), to this case depends on the judge‘s philosophy of law, 
jurisprudence, and jurisprudential temperament, which inform 
the decision to come to grips with whether or not an action is 
―judicially sanctioned.‖ The Majority holds that the decisions 
of the trial judge on the record in this case did not qualify as 
―judicially sanctioned‖ actions. I am equally convinced that 
they did. 
 
Before setting forth detailed support for my view, it is 
necessary to emphasize the specific holding or decision of the 
Court in Buckhannon because it is the decision, and not the 
reasoning, that forms the precedent. The expression stare 
decisis is but an abbreviation of stare decisis et non quieta 
movere (to stand by or adhere to decisions and not disturb 
that which is settled). ―Decisis‖ means, literally and legally, 
―the decision.‖ The doctrine is not ―stare dictis‖ (―to stand by 
or keep to what was said‖). Nor is the doctrine stare 
rationibus decidendi (―to keep to the reasoning of past 
cases‖). Rather, a case is important for what it decides: for 
―the what,‖ not ―the why,‖ and not ―the how.‖ Thus, stare 
decisis means what the court did, not what it said. 
 
2 
The Court in Buckhannon stated: ―we hold that the 
‗catalyst theory‘ is not a permissible basis for the award of 
attorney‘s fees under the [Fair Housing Amendments Act of 
1988, or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990].‖ 532 
U.S. at 610. Earlier, the Court had explained that attorney 
fees should not be awarded pursuant to the catalyst theory 
because that theory ―allows an award where there is no 
judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the 
parties.‖ Id. at 605. Thus, the issue for decision in this case is 
whether there was such judicially sanctioned change. 
 
Today the Majority makes clear that the Supreme 
Court has not precluded the possibility that a ―judicially 
sanctioned‖ change may include events other than a judgment 
on the merits or a consent decree: 
 
As noted, the Supreme Court has identified two 
formal resolutions that make a winning attorney 
eligible for a fee award: (1) enforceable 
judgments on the merits, and (2) court-ordered 
consent decrees.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604. 
Buckhannon characterized these two resolutions 
as ―examples‖ of decisions that create the 
necessary material alteration of the legal 
relationship of the parties. Id. at 604–05. There 
may be resolutions other than the two identified 
in Buckhannon that warrant prevailing party 
status (although the Supreme Court has yet to 
identify any). 
Maj. Op. at 16. To hold as does the Majority that ―[b]ecause 
no enforceable judgment on the merits was issued in this case, 
and the State‘s actions that mooted the case were voluntary, 
3 
Buckhannon tells us that Live Gold was not a prevailing 
party,‖ Maj. Op. at 19, is to apply a philosophy of 
jurisprudence no longer in general acceptance—conceptual 
jurisprudence, a philosophy that preaches that a principle, if 
sound, ought to be applied wherever it logically leads, 
without reference to ulterior results—and wholly 
inappropriate for cases that touch upon civil rights. 
 
Without a nod to the effects on future civil rights 
cases, the Majority fashioned a major stumbling block to 
success for civil rights plaintiffs in cases based on § 1983. 
The plaintiff here was: (1) victorious on the merits in 
obtaining a temporary restraining order, duly recorded and 
altering the position of the parties, and (2) able to persuade 
the District Court at the preliminary injunction hearing that 
formal registration of their mark was unnecessary. That the 
District Court told the plaintiff, ―in effect [you‘ve] won the 
case,‖ shows that Live Gold was, in effect, the prevailing 
party on the merits. 
I. 
 
I am proud of this Court‘s civil rights history from as 
far back as 1939, when this Court upheld First and Fourth 
Amendments rights in Hague v. Committee of Industrial 
Organization, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939), aff‘d and 
modified, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Introducing his opinion for 
our Court, Judge Biggs wrote: ―The question presented by the 
appeal at bar is whether or not certain fundamental civil 
liberties safeguarded by the Constitution of the United States 
shall be observed and protected in Jersey City or shall there 
stand abridged.‖ Id. at 777. Thus, more than 20 years before 
the resuscitation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167 (1961), this Court was in the business of expanding, 
4 
not contracting, civil rights protections.
1
 Until today. Until a 
Majority of this Court embarked on a jurisprudential 
                                              
1
  See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4 (1994) 
(identifying the Third Circuit as having ―[t]he most 
expansive approach‖ among the courts of appeals as to the 
extent to which a claim of malicious prosecution is 
actionable under § 1983 (citing Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 
66, 70 (3d Cir. 1988) (Becker, Hutchinson, Scirica))); 
Pfeiffer by Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 
F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir. 1990) (Higginbotham, Scirica, 
Aldisert) (diverging from other courts of appeals to hold 
that compensatory relief is available for certain Title IX 
violations), abrogated on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. 
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Melo v. 
Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990) (Sloviter, Becker, 
Stapleton) (holding that state officers sued in their 
individual capacities are ―persons‖ for the purposes of 
§ 1983), aff‘d, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of 
Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988) (Becker, Hutchinson, 
Scirica) (holding that under the circumstances and in light 
of the purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the first-filed rule did not govern the case), aff‘d, 
493 U.S. 182 (1990); Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 
784 F.2d 505, 514–517 (3d Cir. 1986) (Adams, Gibbons, 
Stapleton) (providing a broad definition of ―race‖ under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981), aff‘d, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Ricks v. Del. 
State Coll., 605 F.2d 710, 712 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, 
Rosenn, Higginbotham) (identifying the ―humanitarian and 
remedial purpose‖ of Title VII to hold that its limitations 
period does not run until termination of employment), 
rev‘d, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 
(3d Cir. 1974) (Staley, Gibbons, Weis) (upholding a 
5 
adventure that makes it unnecessarily difficult for civil rights 
plaintiffs who seek to enforce federal rights and statutes. The 
Majority does so by erecting roadblocks before plaintiffs who 
seek to qualify as a ―prevailing party‖ under § 1988. 
 
The Majority employs a stingy interpretation of 
―judicially sanctioned,‖ declaring that there was no act of 
sanctioning notwithstanding that: (1) the District Court 
entered a Temporary Restraining Order based on the merits, 
and (2) in the subsequent preliminary injunction hearing the 
District Court told the defendant that it completely agreed 
                                                                                                     
district court‘s finding that violations of constitutional 
rights by Philadelphia police occurred in a high number of 
instances and allowing injunctive relief), rev‘d, 423 U.S. 
362 (1976); Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 
446 (3d Cir. 1971) (McLaughlin, Aldisert, Gibbons) 
(concluding that the phrase ―by a person to be aggrieved‖ 
in Civil Rights Act of 1964 showed ―a congressional 
intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by 
Article III of the Constitution‖), quoted approvingly by 
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 
(1972), abrogated by Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 
131 S. Ct. 863, 869 (2011); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 
130 F.2d 652 (3d Cir. 1942) (Biggs, Maris, Jones, 
Goodrich) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction 
over alleged deprivations of constitutional rights pursuant 
to the Civil Rights Act of 1871), aff‘d, 319 U.S. 157 
(1943); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d 
Cir. 1939) (Biggs, Clark, Kalodner) (affirming an 
injunction against compulsory flag salutes in schools), 
rev‘d, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
6 
with the plaintiff, (3) the defendant conceded that the State of 
New Jersey would be bound by the District Court‘s 
interpretation of the trademark, (4) the plaintiff moved for 
entry of summary judgment in its favor, and (5) the District 
Court declared entry of summary judgment was unnecessary 
because, ―I just don‘t know what else there is to address . . . 
in effect, [Live Gold] has won the case.‖  
 
The Majority nonetheless contends that although Live 
Gold won the case, the win was not ―judicially sanctioned‖ 
because the District Court did not enter on the record five 
words: ―Plaintiff‘s summary judgment motion granted,‖ or 
four words ―Judgment ordered for plaintiff.‖ 
 
The Majority nonetheless contends that although the 
District Court told the parties that the plaintiff won the case, 
the win was not ―judicially sanctioned‖ because the District 
Court did not formally enter its decision on the record. The 
Majority‘s interpretation of ―judicially sanctioned‖ is 
reminiscent of the writ-based common law pleading rules, 
which were so inflexible that a plaintiff that used the wrong 
writ was out of court. It was a system ―that had become rigid 
and rarified‖ and a system in which ―a party could easily lose 
on technical rules.‖2 I therefore disagree with my colleagues 
of the Majority who believe Buckhannon prohibits us from 
determining that the plaintiff was a prevailing party. That 
case does not establish technical rules that prohibit us from 
acknowledging that the plaintiff was the prevailing party. 
Let‘s face it. It‘s not that Buckhannon prohibits us. It‘s a 
                                              
2
  Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 917 (1987). 
7 
matter of choice. The Majority simply chooses to not extend 
its holding to different facts and precepts involving attorney 
fees in civil rights actions. I prefer to follow the history of this 
Court in expanding holdings in civil rights cases in new and 
fresh fact patterns. In so doing, I adhere to what our Court has 
been doing since 1939, and we carry forward the pioneer 
efforts of American jurisprudents from as early as the end of 
the Nineteenth Century. 
 
II. 
 
The distance between the Majority and the dissent in 
this case can be traced through more than one hundred years 
of American legal history. As early as 1897, American courts 
were being chided for undue reliance on theoretical concepts. 
This was the philosophy behind European attempts to 
establish codes in every country on the continent. German 
Professor Rudolf von Ihering pioneered the work of replacing 
the European jurisprudence of conceptions with a 
jurisprudence based upon results. Our own thinkers, across 
the Atlantic Ocean, followed suit. In The Path of the Law in 
1897 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. gently admonished: 
 
I think that the judges themselves have failed 
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing 
considerations of social advantage. The duty is 
inevitable, and the result of the often 
proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such 
considerations is simply to leave the very 
8 
ground and foundation of judgments 
inarticulate, and often unconscious . . .
3
 
By 1906, Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School was 
trumpeting the same theme. He described our system as 
conceptual jurisprudence, a slavish adherence to elegantia 
juris, the symmetry of law, and suggested that we resembled 
too much the rigid German Begriffsjurisprudenz.
4
 This led 
him to call upon the American Bar Association to put an end 
to mechanical jurisprudence: ―The most important and most 
constant cause of dissatisfaction with all law at all times is to 
be found in the necessarily mechanical operation of legal 
rules.‖5 
 
In 1921, Benjamin N. Cardozo delivered the Storrs 
lectures at Yale, stating: ―The final cause of law is the welfare 
of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently 
justify its existence.‖6 The same year, he seized the 
opportunity to put his new theory into practice by publicly 
rejecting blind conceptual jurisprudence. See Hynes v. N.Y. 
Cent. R.R., 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921). 
 
These thinkers led us out of the methodology of 
conceptual jurisprudence—the view that a legal precept 
                                              
3
  Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. 
Rev. 457, 467 (1897). 
4
  Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence 608, 610 (1908). 
5
  Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with 
the Administration of Justice, Address Before the Am. Bar 
Ass‘n (Aug. 29th 1906). 
6
  Benjamin N. Cardozo. The Nature of the Judicial Process 
66 (1921). 
9 
should be followed to its dryly logical extreme, regardless of 
its effects on society. If Pound‘s 1908 warning against 
mechanical decision making did not create a new American 
school of jurisprudence, it at least spawned widespread 
respectability for social utilitarianism. It added a new 
dimension to law‘s traditional objectives of consistency, 
certainty and predictability—a concern for society‘s welfare, 
elegantly described by Professor Harry W. Jones as a legal 
rule that ―contributes to the establishment and preservation of 
a social environment in which the quality of human life can 
be spirited, improving and unimpaired.‖7 In all but a few 
areas of static law, mechanical jurisprudence has become 
more historical than operational, except for what the Majority 
does in this case. 
 
III. 
 
I turn now to legal philosophy, jurisprudence and 
jurisprudential temperament, because part of what divides the 
Majority and the dissent is a difference in views of these 
concepts.
8
 When I speak of legal philosophy, I am addressing 
a very broad inquiry into what the relationship between 
individuals and their government, ought to be. In this context, 
the problems of legal philosophy are problems of normative 
political philosophy. So perceived, legal philosophy inquires 
into the problems of terminology, legal methods, the role of 
precedent, statutory interpretation, underlying rationale, the 
                                              
7
  Harry W. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1023, 1030 (1974). 
8
  Ruggero J. Aldisert, Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and 
Jurisprudential of Federal Judges, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 453 
(1987). 
10 
use of different types of authority, the efficacy of various 
controls and their operation in diverse factual scenarios, and 
the basic issues concerning the values that are implemented. 
When I speak of a legal philosophy, I am addressing 
the specific answers to these basic inquiries forthcoming from 
very respectable thinkers, both in academia and on the bench. 
Each thinker probably articulates or at least demonstrates 
some particular legal philosophy. Hence, each of their 
individual solutions to myriad problems of judicial decision 
making is what I call a legal philosophy. 
 
How a judge interprets the concept of ―judicially 
sanctioned‖ depends on the legal philosophy the judge 
chooses to espouse. It cannot be seriously debated that the 
Majority‘s refusal to grant attorney fees in this case will limit 
future civil rights actions, discouraging the Congressional 
intent to provide attorney fees to civil rights plaintiffs under 
§ 1988. It will discourage settlements, prolong litigation, and 
make work for overburdened district judges. Defendants will 
use complications in petitions for § 1988 attorney fees as 
bargaining tools in negotiations for calculating damages. 
Members of the Majority arrive at their decision by adhering 
to a philosophy of conceptual jurisprudence, an approach to 
the law that extends a legal precept to a drily logical extreme, 
regardless of the results upon society, and a philosophy that 
has found rejection in our courts for almost 100 years. 
 
I turn now to the concept of jurisprudence. I perceive it 
as separate and apart from legal philosophy, in that it includes 
obligatory norms, both substantive and procedural, that shape 
and regulate the life of a people. This concept of 
jurisprudence more or less takes the form of an aggregate of 
legal precepts, a sort of by-laws of a given society or rules 
11 
that govern a given social order. It is law as it is, not as it 
ought to be. It is more properly a juridical science than a 
philosophy. Yet jurisprudence may also be considered ―a 
body of traditional ideas as to how legal precepts should be 
interpreted and applied and causes decided, and a traditional 
technique of developing and applying legal precepts whereby 
these precepts are eked out, extended, restricted, and adapted 
to the exigencies of administration of justice.‖9 
 
I find it necessary to distinguish between legal 
philosophy and jurisprudence. If a judge is truly following ―a 
body of traditional ideas,‖ he or she is probably observing the 
law as it ―is‖ and not as it ―ought to be.‖ If we talk about law 
as it should be, we have entered the world of legal philosophy 
and philosophical generalities. Immanuel Kant suggested that 
the distinction existed in two simple Latin words. When we 
ask ―quid jus?‖ we are seeking some general principle of 
philosophy to help us decide what the law ought to be. When 
we ask ―quid juris?‖ we are seeking what already has been 
established as part of the jurisprudence.
10
 
 
Unfortunately, the line between what the law is and 
what it ought to be is not always a bright one. As this case 
shows, one legal precept, pushed to the limit of its logic with 
inadequate consideration of the results, may point to one 
conclusion; another precept, followed with equal logic but 
emphasis on the results, may point with equal certainty to 
another conclusion. Or take the questions posed by Cardozo: 
                                              
9
  Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 Harv. 
L.Rev. 641, 645 (1923). 
10
  Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law 43-46 (Kelly ed. 
1974) (Hastie trans. 1887). 
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If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to 
follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do 
I reach the rule that will make a precedent for 
the future? If I am seeking logical consistency, 
the symmetry of the legal structure, how far 
shall I seek it? At what point shall the quest be 
halted by some discrepant custom, by some 
consideration of the social welfare, by my own 
or the common standards of justice and 
morals?
11
 
It is here where that quality I call jurisprudential 
temperament, or the judge‘s intuition, comes into play. 
Temperament invariably influences the decision because it 
inclines the decision maker one way or another.
12
 It is a major 
determinant in the case at bar in deciding the best 
interpretation of ―judicial sanctioned.‖ 
 
If, as in cases like this one, the result is not 
predetermined and the law is not clear, the courts are faced 
with what Professor H.L.A. Hart called the ―penumbral‖ 
issues, where the language of the legislation or a particular 
putative precedent of a court is general.
13
 Whether a judge 
attempts to clarify a penumbral area of the law reflects a 
value judgment, and is indicative of the judge‘s 
                                              
11
  Cardozo, supra note 6. 
12
  The key word is ―jurisprudential,‖ not ―judicial‖ 
temperament. The latter is descriptive of a judge‘s 
personality while sitting on the bench during a trial or on 
appeal. 
13
  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 121-122 (1961). 
13 
jurisprudential temperament. Some judges have lower 
thresholds than others, and are more inclined to find solace in 
shades and fringes rather than the black-letter law. When this 
problem occurs, as is the circumstance of this divided Court, 
Professor Ronald Dworkin suggests that the decision depends 
―on the judge‘s own preferences among a sea of respectable 
extralegal standards, any one in principle eligible, because if 
that were the case we could not say that any rules were 
binding.‖14 
 
The extent to which a court adheres to the legal 
precepts attached to the facts in Buckhannon rather than those 
present in the galaxy of our civil rights cases that have 
extended plaintiffs‘ rights, is not just a matter of logical 
analysis. In dealing with a putative precedent the judge‘s 
function goes beyond a perception of what was really 
intended; he or she exercises a choice. In the case at bar, it is 
a choice between: (a) conceptual jurisprudence, which 
preaches that a principle ought to be applied wherever it 
logically leads, without reference to results; or (b) a 
jurisprudence of results, which preaches ―the establishment 
and preservation of a social environment in which the quality 
of human life can be spirited, improving and unimpaired.‖15 
Justice Walter V. Shaefer taught us: 
 
[M]ost depends upon the judge‘s unspoken 
notion as to the function of his court. If he 
views the role of the court as a passive one, he 
will be willing to delegate the responsibility for 
change . . . . If he views that court as an 
                                              
14
  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 89-90 (1977). 
15
  Jones, supra note 7. 
14 
instrument of society designed to reflect in its 
decisions the morality of the community, he 
will be more likely to look precedent in the 
teeth and to measure it against the ideals and the 
aspiration of his time.
 16
 
* * * * * 
 
Through the years, it is said that in this Court we have 
dissent without dissension. It is in this spirit that I have 
expressed, respectfully, a failure to agree with a large number 
of my colleagues without in the least inferring any diminution 
of my great respect for each of them. And so, as the Marine 
Corps Hymn says, it is at this ―clime and place‖ that a 
difference in legal philosophy, jurisprudence and 
jurisprudential temperament is demonstrated in the 
divergence between the Majority and dissenting judges‘ 
views upon applications for attorney fees under § 1988. That 
such a difference exists is not unusual; appellate courts are 
fashioned as multi-judge institutions so that different views 
may be publicly and forcibly expressed. What is unfortunate 
about the difference in this case, however, is the result that 
the Majority‘s holding will impose upon future civil rights 
plaintiffs. 
                                              
16
  Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 3, 23 (1966). 
